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Recent Decisions

FEDERAL
COURTS--MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION-C NGE
OF
VENUE-ASSIGNMENT OF CASE FOR TRIAL-The United States Supreme

Court held that a court handling a multidistrict litigation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407 does not have the authority to grant a change of venue
motion to assign the case to itself for trial.
Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956
(1998).
In "1992, Lexecon Inc., a law and economics consulting firm, filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ("North District of Illinois") against three law firms, Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach ("Milberg Weiss"); Cotchett, Illston & Pitre;
and Greenfield & Chimicles, and certain partners of two of the firms on
the basis of their conduct as counsel for a class of plaintiffs in a class action involving various parties, including Lexecon.' The law firms had
represented the plaintiffs in the Lincoln Savings Litigation.2 All cases arising from the failure of the Lincoln Savings & Loan Association were consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the United States Court for the Dis1. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956, 959
(1998). Lexecon consultants frequently testified as defense expert witnesses in securities class
actions brought by the defendant firms. See, Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss, 102 F.3d 1524, 1528
(9th Cir. 1996). Lexecon sued Patrick Coughlin, Blake Harper, William S. Lerach, Kevin P.
Roddy, Leonard B. Simon, Melvyn I. Weiss, Patricia Hynes, Michael C. Spencer, and former
partner Stephen Steinberg and Jared Specthrie from Milberg and Joseph Cotchett and Susan
Illston partners in the Cotchett, Illston & Pitre firm. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes
& Lerach, 845 F. Supp. 1377, 1381 n.2 (D. Ariz. 1993).
2. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 959. The Lincoln Savings Litigation involved violations of
various securities laws by Charles Keating and American Continental Corporation. Id.
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trict of Arizona ("Arizona District Court") pursuant to the multidistrict
litigation rules set forth in the United States Code for pretrial proceedings in the Federal District of Arizona.3 In the Lincoln Savings Litigation,
the plaintiffs alleged that Lexecon provided inaccurate and misleading
reports to bank regulators about the financial condition of Lincoln Savings & Loan and its parent company.4 The court entered a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice as to Lexecon in August 1992.'
Lexecon maintained that the lawsuit was meritless and was pursued
as a vendetta by the law firms.6 Consequently, after Lexecon was dismissed from the class action, it filed this suit in the Northern District of
Illinois, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, defamation, and commercial disparagement.' In 1993, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("J.P.M.L.") granted the defendants' § 1407(a) motion seeking
consolidation of the matter under the Multidistrict Litigation Statute and
ordered that the case be transferred and consolidated with the Lincoln
Savings Litigation pending in the Arizona District Court.'
3. Id. The Multidistrict Litigation Statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending
in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. . . . Such transfer shall be made by
the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation . . . for the convenience of parties
and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.
Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
unless it shall have been previously terminated ....

The panel may separate any

claim, cross-claim, counter-claim or third-party claim and remand any of such
claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1993).
4. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 959. American Continental Corporation is the parent company of Lincoln Savings & Loan. Id.
5. See Lexecon, 845 F. Supp. at 1382. Under the terms of a "resolution," defendant
Touche Ross agreed to pay a cash settlement and to perform administrative claims services that
were to be subcontracted to Lexecon. Id. In return for Lexecon's services, the court entered a
dismissal. Id. Because of disagreements among the parties, Lexecon discharged its obligations by
paying $700,000 to the class action plaintiffs rather than by providing the administrative services. Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1528.
6.
Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 959. In the Lincoln Savings Litigation, the court denied the
defendants motion for leave to file a fifth amended complaint adding Lexecon as a party. Lexecon, 845 F. Supp. at 1382. The firms subsequently prepared a sixth amended complaint which
was allegedly circulated to potential clients of Lexecon. Id. Several days later, the firms revised
and filed the sixth amended complaint. Id.
7. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 959. After learning of the Lexecon suit, Judge Bilby, who
presided over the Lincoln Savings Litigation, issued an order in which he attempted to explain the
details behind the Lexecon dismissal. Id. Lexecon appealed Judge Bilby's order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1993). The Multidistrict Litigation Statute established
and outlined the creation of the J.P.M.L. Id. The statute provides for the coordination or con-
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In November 1993, the Arizona District Court dismissed the malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims but deferred ruling on the
defendants' motion for summary judgment pending completion of discovery 9 In the meantime, the remaining parties to the Lincoln Savings
Litigation reached a final settlement in March, 1994.10 That August,
Lexecon filed a motion under rule 14(b) of the rules of Procedure of the
J.P.M.L. requesting that the case be returned to the J.P.M.L. for transfer
to the Northern District of Illinois for trial." The defendants opposed the
motion on the basis that discovery was not complete, filed a countermotion requesting a change of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)," and
asked the Arizona District Court to assign the case to itself for trial.13
Judge Roll deferred decision on these motions.14 Lexecon renewed its
remand motion in November, 1994, and the defendants again opposed
the motion and requested a § 1404(a) transfer to the Arizona District
Court. 5 Again, the judge deferred ruling on the motions.16 In April,
1995, the Arizona District Court dismissed all claims except for the
defamation claim against Milberg Weiss.1 The court granted Milberg
Weiss' § 1404(a) change of venue motion and the Arizona District Court

solidation of pretrial proceedings for cases with common questions of fact. Id. The J.P.M.L.
found that the case shared common issues with the Lincoln Savings cases pending in Arizona,
transferred the case to Arizona, and assigned it to Judge Roll. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 959. Judge
Bilby, had earlier recused himself on the basis of the order he had issued concerning the resolution of the Lincoln Savings Litigation. Id.
9. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 960. Summary judgment is defined as "a procedural device
available for prompt . . disposition of controversy without trial when there is no dispute of
material facts ... and [the moving party] is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1435 (6th ed. 1991).
10. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 960.
11. Id. The Multidistrict Litigation Statute provides that: "the panel may prescribe rules
for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with the Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(0 (1993). The applicable rule provides that "[e]ach...
action that has not been terminated in the transferee district court shall be remanded by the
Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the
transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 1506." RULES OF PROC. OF THE
J.P.M.L. 14(b). Id.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1993). The section reads, "For the convenience
of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought." Id.
13. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 960.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The court granted defendant Cotchette's 54(b) motion to dismiss. Id. Rule 54
(b) allows a final judgment to be entered for one or more claims or parties precluding any further
claims against that party. FED. R. CIv. P. 54 (b).
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assigned the case to itself for trial. 8 At the same time, the court denied
Lexecon's § 1407 motion to remand the case to the J.P.M.L. for assignment to the Northern District of Illinois. 9 Lexecon responded by filing a
petition for mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit"). 2o The Ninth Circuit denied Lexecon's
request to vacate
the Arizona District Court order assigning the case to
21
itself for trial.

The court dismissed all of the claims except one defamation claim
arising out of a letter written by a partner at Milberg Weiss.22 The letter
in question appeared in The National Law Joumal and was in response to
a story concerning the Lincoln Savings Litigation.23 Lexecon alleged that
the letter was defamatory because it incorrectly stated that Judge Bilby
"in a published opinion... detail[ed] [Lexecon's] wrongful activities on
behalf" of Keating and his fraudulent dealings.' The jury found in favor
of Milberg Weiss and judgment was entered.' Lexecon's appeal to the
Ninth Circuit alleged as error the denial of the § 1407 motion to remand
the matter to the Northern District of Illinois at the completion of pretrial activities.26
The Ninth Circuit, which had previously denied Lexecon's writ of
mandamus, affirmed the Arizona District Court and found that the court
properly exercised its discretion when it assigned the case to itself for trial
on the basis of J.P.M.L. rule 14(b) and previous court decisions supporting self-assignment of cases. 27 Judge Kozinski, the sole dissenter, argued
18. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 960.
19. Id.
20. Id. A writ of mandamus is an "order from a superior court to an inferior court commanding performance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 961 (6th ed. 1991). If a district judge does
not take action that he should, the superior court will order such action. Id. Mandamus is a
drastic remedy and is only used in extraordinary situations. Id.
21. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 960. The majority did not discuss the merits of Lexecon's
argument and reasoned that Lexecon would have an opportunity to obtain relief on direct appeal, thereby eliminating the necessity of a mandamus order. Id. The court did note a conflict
between rule 14(b) and §§ 1407 and 1404. Id. Judge Kozinski was the sole dissenter. Id.
22. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss, 884 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (D. Ariz. 1995); citing Randall Samborn, Firms Sued in Wake of Lincoln S&L Case, NATL L.J., Dec. 14, 1992.
23. Lexecon, 884 F. Supp. at 1393; citing Samborn, supra note 22.
24. Id. at 1394.
25. Id.
26. Id. Lexecon also appealed the dismissal of the other claims, the entry of final judg
ment for Cotchett, and the denial of motion to remand the case to the J.P.M.L.. Id.
27. Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1541. Self-assignment is the term used to refer to those cases
consolidated by the J.P.M.L. to a district court, which then assigns the case to itself for trial. Id.
at 1531-32. The court relied on past practice of self-assignments by courts after completion of
pretrial activity. Id. The court found that self-assignment resulted in increased efficiency in
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that § 1407 requires that the case is to be remanded to the J.P.M.L. before trial.2" Judge Kozinski noted that judges had historically granted selfassignment, which led to the promulgation of J.P.M.L. rule 14(b).2 9 Lexecon filed a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.3" The
Court granted certiorari to decide whether a district court conducting
pretrial proceedings in multidistrict litigation may assign a case to itself
pursuant to the § 1404(a) change of venue statute.3
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the plain language of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), and
J.P.M.L. rule 14(b).32 Milberg Weiss argued that rule 14(b) was enacted
pursuant to the authority granted to the J.P.M.L. by § 1407(0 of the
Multidistrict Litigation Statute.33 The Court noted that rule 14(b) allows
the transferee judge to assign the case under either § 1404(a)--the
change of venue statute-or § 1406--the cure or waiver of defects statute.34 The Supreme Court concluded that rule 14(b) contradicted the
plain language of the statute and, therefore, was invalid.35 The Court
further explained that the longstanding practice of self-assignment
could
36
defeat the clear meaning of the statute and invalidate the rule.
Milberg Weiss argued that because a § 1404(a) change of venue
motion is a pretrial matter and because the courts handling matters consolidated pursuant to § 1407 are to handle all pretrial matters, the transdisposition of litigation. Id. Furthermore, the court relied upon J.P.M.L. rule 14(b), which
authorizes such transfers. Id. See RULES OF PROC. OF THEJ.P.M.L. Rule 14(b).
28. Lexecon., 102 F.3d at 1540-41 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
29. Id.at 1541 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
30. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 960. A writ of certiorari is used by the Supreme Court as a
discretionary device to choose cases it wishes to hear. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 156 (6th ed.
1991).
31. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 960-61.
32. Id.
at 961.
33. Id..
34. Id. Section 1406 provides 'The district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a) (1993). Rule 14(b) of the Rules of Judicial Panel states, in pertinent part:
Each transferred action that has not been terminated in the transferee district
court shall be remanded by the panel to the transferor district for trial unless
ordered transferred .. .under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406. In the
event . . .[of transfer] no further action of the panel shall be necessary to
authorize further proceedings including trial ....
RULES OF PROC. OF THE J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b).

35. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 964.
36. Id. at 961. Citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1993). The Court noted
that previous decisions allowed self-assignment by transferee courts relying upon J.P.M.L. Rule
14(b). Id. However, the past practice is not is not sufficient to allow rule 14(b) to stand in
conflict with the clear meaning of the statute. Id. at 962.
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feree court should be permitted to rule on the motion. 37 The Court rejected this argument, noting that the statute obligates the J.P.M.L. to
remand any pending case.3" The statute clearly indicates that there are
only two options for under § 1407--termination or remand to the
J.P.M.L.39
Milberg Weiss argued that J.P.M.L. rule 14(c) requires action by the
parties or the court before the J.P.M.L. will consider remand.' Because
neither the parties nor the court initiated any action, Milberg Weiss argued that the J.P.M.L. could not order a remand.41 The Court held that
any interpretation of J.P.M.L. rule 14(c) must consider § 1407(o, which
requires that the rules promulgated by the J.P.M.L. be consistent with the
statute. 2 Therefore, rule 14(c) cannot absolve the J.P.M.L. of the mandatory statutory obligation to remand a case to the originating court if
that case has not been terminated.43
The Court also held that a § 1404(a) change of venue motion does
not terminate a case." The language of the statute makes clear that only
two options exist for disposition of cases under the Multidistrict Litigation Statute: termination or remand.45 A change of venue motion neither
terminates nor operates to remand the case; therefore, the transferee
court is prohibited from ruling on the motion and assigning the case to
itself for trial. '
The Court then reviewed § 1407(h), which allows self-transfer in
37. Id. at 961-62. Section 1407 permits the transferee court to handle all pretrial activity. 28 U.S.C § 1407 (a).
38. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 961-62.
39. Id.
40. Id. Rule 14(c) states, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Panel shall consider remand of each transferred action . . . at or before the
conclusion of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings on
(i) motion of any party,
(ii) suggestion of the transferee district court, or
(iii) the Panel's own initiative, by entry of an order to show cause, a conditional remand order or other appropriate order.
RULES OF PROC. OF THE J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b).
41. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 962.
42. Id. Section 1407(0 provides that 'The panel may prescribe rules for the conduct of
its business not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 28
U.S.C. § 1407(0.
43. Lexecon, 118 S.Ct. at 962.
44. Id. at 963. Milberg Weiss argued that the motion terminated the applicability of §
1407 to the case, thereby, relieving the J.P.M.L. of any further duty regarding the case. Id.
45. Id. The Court explained the meaning of termination in the Multidistrict Litigation
Statute by noting, "[The statute] says that such an action, not its acquired personality, must be
terminated before the Panel is excused from ordering remand." Id.
46. Id. at 962.
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cases involving the Clayton Act."7 The Court reasoned that Congress'
inclusion of the self-transfer language in § 1407(h) demonstrates that
Congress was mindful of the distinction between pretrial and trial matters
in drafting the statute.' Indeed, the Court decided that, by not including
language regarding self-assignment for trial in the sections that precede
§ 1407 (h) of the statute, Congress clearly intended to limit the activity of
the transferee court to pretrial activities. 49
Next, the Court reviewed the legislative history of § 1407.0 According to the legislative reports, the sponsors of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute were concerned that the legislation would interfere with a
plaintiffs right to choose the venue." The sponsors' comments emphasized that consolidation and coordination were merely for the purpose of
pretrial activities.52
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit and
invalidated J.P.M.L. rule 14(b) on the basis of the plain language of the
Multidistrict Litigation Statute. 53 The Court held that rule 14(b) cannot
be reconciled with 28 U.S.C. § 1407(o, which provides that "the panel
may prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with
Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."54 The Court
concluded that the change of venue in this case was precluded by 1407. 55
47. Id. Section 1407(h) states 'Notwithstanding the provisions of § 1404 or subsection
(0 of this section, the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation may consolidate and transfer with
or without the consent of the parties, for both pretrial purposes and for trial, any action brought
under § 4C of the Clayton Act... ." RULES OF PROC. OF THE J.P.M.L. Rule 14(h). The Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12-27, is a "federal law... amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act dealing
with antitrust regulations and unfair trade practices." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (6th ed.
1991).
48. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 963. The argument is that subsection (h) contains an exclusion for subsection (f) but not one for subsection (a); therefore, subsection (a) must be read to
include transfer for trial as well as for pretrial procedures. Id. at 963.
49. Id. The Court reasoned that the fact that subsection (h) was enacted eight years
after subsection (a) further establishes that the distinction in each subsection is evidence of
Congress' intent to differentiate between actions transferred for trial and those consolidated for
pretrial activities only. Id.
50. Id. at 964. Milberg Weiss argued that the sponsors of the bill commented that the
change of venue statute, § 1404, was available to consolidate cases for trial. Id. The Court
responded by clarifying the issue. Id. at 964. 'The question is not whether a change of venue
may be ordered in a case consolidated under section 1407 (a); .. if an order may be made under
section 1404(a) it may be made after remand of the case to the originating district court." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. See also, H.R. REP. NO. 1130 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898.
53. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 966. In determining the proper remedy, the Court concluded that the change of venue in this case was precluded by § 1407.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1993).
55. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 965.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 37:371

The Court reasoned that, when the authority of "courts (and special
panels)" is statutorily limited and that authority is abused, then the objecting party is entitled to relief in the form of remand. 6 Justice Scalia did
not join in the portion of the opinion discussing the legislative history of
the Multidistrict Litigation Statute."
Since its enactment, courts have interpreted the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to permit self-assignment by conflating it with § 1404(a)
(the change of venue statute) to achieve a "just and efficient resolution"
of complex litigation.5" As a basis for self-assignment in Lexicon, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the federal circuit courts' practice of sanctioning
the self-assignment of cases.59 The seminal case cited by the courts is
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,'"which allowed a court with jurisdiction pursuant to §
1407 to grant a § 1404(a) motion, assigning the case to itself.6' However,
a proper review of the issue begins with an examination of the legislative
intent behind the enactment of § 1407.
The legislative history of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute clearly
indicates Congress' intention that the statute not interfere with the
plaintiffs choice of venue.62 The purpose of the statute was to "consolidate or coordinate" pretrial discovery in complex multidistrict litigation.63
The CongressionalRecord notes that existing law only permitted a change
of venue for trial or for consolidation of multiple actions pending in the
same court. 6' The record reflects Congress' concern that the new legislation would not include trial transfers and acknowledges that § 1404(a)
exists to allow transfers for trial when such a transfer is desired.65 Finally,
the record indicates that it would be easy to amend § 1407 if it were ever
to be used to allow for consolidation for trial.'
56. Id.
57. Id. at 958. Justice Scalia did not join in Part II-C (located at page 964). Id.
58. Lexecon, 102 F.3d (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. 447 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1971).
61. Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 122. Judge Kozinski's dissenting opinion in Lexecon notes that,
although many circuit courts appear to sanction such self-assignment practices, most have not
devoted a great deal of analysis to the issue; rather, they merely rely on Pfizer, which provides
only a one-page discussion of the issue. 102 F.3d at 1540-41 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
62. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898 (1968).

63.
64.

1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1900.

Id. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404 permits a change of venue to a jurisdiction in which the
case may have originally been brought. Id. Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows for consolidation of actions pending in a single district court. Id.
65.
Id. 'The subsection [a] requires that transferred cases be remanded to the originating district at the close of coordinated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not, therefore,
include the trial of the cases in the consolidated proceeding." Id. at 1901.
66. Id. at 1902.
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In In re Air Crash Disaster at Falls City, Nebraska ("Falls City"), 67 decided in May 1969, the J.P.M.L. refused to grant a § 1407 consolidation
because to do so would cause a delay in the proceedings. The J.P.M.L.
based its decision on the existence of outstanding venue and service issues and the presence of more advanced cases.6 Therefore, because delayed proceedings would be inconsistent with the statute's objective of
judicial efficiency, the J.P.M.L. refused to grant the § 1407 transfer.69 The
J.P.M.L. suggested that any venue or service issues could be resolved by
using § 1406 or § 1404 transfers.7" The J.P.M.L. acknowledged that the
three statutes were not interchangeable and that any analysis of a § 1407
transfer must be viewed with an eye toward judicial efficiency.7 '
Later that year, the J.P.M.L. again addressed § 1407 consolidation
motions in In Re Multidistrict Civil Actions involving Mid-Air Collision near
Hendersonville, N.C. ("Hendersonville"),72 which involved sixty-four lawsuits. The J.P.M.L. refused to grant a § 1407 transfer for consolidation of
two cases that had been transferred to the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina ("Western District of North
Carolina") pursuant to a § 1404(a) motion.73 The court did, however, use
§ 1407 to consolidate for pretrial purposes all of the other cases that were
in the Western District of North Carolina.74 The defendants argued that
the J.P.M.L. should not rule on the § 1407 consolidation motion but
should wait for a ruling on their pending § 1404(a) motion for transfer to
the Western District of North Carolina for pretrial and trial.75 The
J.P.M.L. granted the § 1407 consolidation without waiting for the origi-

67. 298 F. Supp. 1323 (.P.M.L. 1969).
68. Air Crash Disaster at Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323. On August 6, 1966, an
airplane broke apart in flight and crashed, killing 42 individuals on board. Id. at 1324. The
disaster resulted in 21 cases, which were filed in five different federal district courts. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. In re Multidistrict Civil Actions involving Mid-Air Collision near Hendersonville,
N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 (J.P.M.L. 1969). The cases arose from an air collision that resulted in 82 deaths. Id. at 1039. Lawsuits were filed in state and federal courts. Id. A § 1407
motion for consolidation of all of the federal actions to the Western District of North Carolina
for pretrial proceedings was filed. Sixty-one cases were in the Western District of North Carolina, two were in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, and one
case, which involved 13 estates, was in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. at 1040.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1041. The two cases that were pending in Missouri were consolidated with
the 61 cases in North Carolina. Id. at 1039.
75. Id.at 1040.
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nating court to rule on the § 1404(a) motion.76 The J.P.M.L. suggested
that the originating court would have an opportunity to rule on a §
1404 (a) motion upon the completion of discovery."
In granting the § 1407 consolidation in Hendersonvi//e, the J.P.M.L.
relied on the stated purposes of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute,
which are to provide "for the convenience of parties and witnesses and..
[to] promote the just and efficient conduct of these actions .... 7 8 The
J.P.M.L. declined to address whether it retained jurisdiction over the
cases previously transferred under the change of venue statute and declined to consolidate them. 79 Hendersonvile did not involve a transferee
court ruling on a § 1404 motion to assign the case to itself, but it is germane because the J.P.M.L. emphasized the overriding purpose of the
statute as promoting judicial efficiency.
In 1969, the J.P.M.L. reviewed sixteen patent and antitrust cases
filed in six different courts and involving a single defendant."0 The
J.P.M.L. found that all of the cases involved similar issues of fact, which
made them ideal for consolidation for pretrial purposes under § 1407.1
Koratron argued that all of the cases should be transferred under §
1404(a) for trial; the other parties requested consolidation for pretrial
proceedings only under § 1407.2 In rejecting Koratron's argument, the
J.P.M.L. held that the cases were to be consolidated under § 1407 for
pretrial purposes only.8" Comparing Hendersonvile and Falls City, the
J.P.M.L. concluded that §§ 1404(a), 1406, and 1407 should be used together to promote judicial efficiency.' One of the plaintiffs alleged that
76. Id.
77. Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. at 1039.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1041. The court was concerned that any action to transfer the case on a
section 1407 motion would disrupt the review process. Id. The parties could renew their section 1407 transfer request if the order is set aside. Id. The J.P.M.L. further suggested that the
parties could arrange to participate in the discovery that would occur in North Carolina with the
section 1407 transferred cases. Id.
80. In re Multidistrict Patent and Antitrust Litigation involving Koratron, 302 F. Supp.
239, 240 O.P.M.L. 1969). The litigation involved 16 cases originally filed in six separate courts
involving questions concerning the use of patents and licensing agreements by Koratron as a
restraint of trade. Id.
81. Koratron, 302 F. Supp. at 240. The J.P.M.L. emphasized that the statutory objectives of section 1407 (a) is to "promote the just and efficient conduct for such actions" in a forum
convenient to parties and witnesses. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
82. Koratron,302 F. Supp. at 242.
83. Id. at 243. Because all cases concerned common issues of fact, the court decided
that the cases should be consolidated under section 1407. Id. The remainder of the opinion
discussed to which court the cases should be transferred. Id.
84. Id. at 242. "Sections 1404(a), 1406(a), and 1407 are not mutually exclusive and
when appropriate, should be used in concert to effect the most expeditious disposition of multi-
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its case was relatively uncomplicated and argued that the disposition of
its case would be delayed if consolidated with the other cases.85 The
J.P.M.L. suggested that the case could be remanded under § 1407 after
completion of limited discovery if the case was less complex than were
the others.8 6
In Pfizer, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the
issue of whether a court can rule on a § 1404(a) motion in a case consolidated before it under § 1407." Pfizer involved multiple antitrust civil
actions that had been consolidated for pretrial purposes under the Multidistrict Litigation Statute in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.88 The district court, upon a motion for a
change of venue under § 1404(a), transferred the cases not resolved before trial to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.89 The Second Circuit reasoned that, although § 1407(a) mandated
or prohibited actions to be taken by the J.P.M.L., it did not alter the
powers of the judge assigned to the matter.' ° Consequently, the J.P.M.L.
had an obligation to remand the case to the original court after completion of pretrial activity, but the statute does not place the same requirement on the judge, who could rule on any pretrial motion.9
In Pfizer, the Second Circuit also relied on the standard established
in Koratron,which provides that §§ 1407, 1404, and 1406, are to be used
together to promote judicial efficiency in multidistrict litigation.92 Finding
that the essential purpose of § 1407 is to promote efficiency in multidistrict litigation, the Second Circuit reasoned that to require completion of
district litigation." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 123-24. The litigation involved one 154 antitrust civil actions,
which the J.P.M.L. consolidated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 124.
90. Id. The court relied on a provision of § 1407 that states that each action shall be
remanded by the panel after pretrial activities are concluded. Id. (emphasis added). See also 28
U.S.C. § 1407(a).
91. Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 124. In Pfizer, the judge who ruled on the motion had been
specially assigned to the district. Id. The court notes that the judge derived his authority from
28 U.S.C. § 296, which provides that "the judge should have all the powers of a judge of the
court," including the power to rule on change of venue motions. Id. at 125, citing 28 U.S.C. §
296.
92. Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 125, quoting Koratron,302 F. Supp. 239, 242 (.P.M.D.L., 1969).
"Section[s] 1404(a), 1406(a), and 1407 are not mutually exclusive and, when appropriate,
should be used in concert to effect the most expeditious disposition of multidistrict litigation."
Id.
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all pretrial activities in all consolidated actions and then remand the case
to the originating court to entertain a change of venue motion would
create further delay and decrease efficiency.93 Relying on Koratron, the
court held that a transferee court may rule on a change of venue motion
to increase judicial efficiency. 94
The Pfizer Court justified the transferee court's adjudication of the §
1404(a) motion on the basis of J.P.M.L. rule 15(d).9 5 J.P.M.L. rule 15(d),
which is identical to rule 14(b) at issue in Lexecon, requires the J.P.M.L.
to remand cases unless the transferee judge has already transferred the
action to another court pursuant to § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) .96 The United
States Supreme Court concluded that the rule permitting self-assignment
of § 1404 motions promotes judicial efficiency, which is consistent with
the intent of § 1407. 9v
In Lexecon, the Supreme Court noted that federal courts approved
such self-assignment transfers beginning with Pfizer.9 The Second Circuit's analysis in Pfizer is based on an earlier rationale that the purpose of
consolidation under § 1407 is to promote judicial economy.9 In limiting
the scope of its analysis, the Pfizer Court did not examine Congress' rationale for enacting the statute."° Unfortunately, the Pfizer Court's
analysis does not take into account the statute's mandatory remand language. The statute makes clear that an action transferred under the
Multidistrict Litigation Statute is transferred for pretrial purposes only
and should be remanded at the completion of the pretrial phase."1
The Pfizer Court cited Koratronfor the proposition that the purpose
of §§ 1404(a), 1406, and 1407 is judicial economy and that the three
sections should be used together whenever possible to achieve that purpose." 2 However, Koratron involved a decision by the J.P.M.L., and not
93. Pfizer, 447 F. 2d at 125.
94. Id.
95. Id. J.P.M.L. Rule 15(d) is the precursor to Rule 14(b) (relied on by the Ninth
Circuit in Lexecon). Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 961. J.P.M.L. Rule 15(d) provides, "Actions will be
remanded to the district from which they were transferred unless an order has been signed by
the designated transferee judge transferring an action to another district under [a] 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) order." Id.
96. Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 124-25.
97. Id. at 125.
98. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. 956 at 961, citing In re Fine Paper Antitrust Lit., 685 F.2d 810,
820 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 737 F. Supp. 391, 391-94
(E.D. Mich. 1989); In re Viatron Computer Sys. Corp., 89 F.R.D. 431, 432 (D. Mass. 1980).
99. Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 125.

100.

Id.

101.
102.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Koratron,302 F. Supp. at 242.
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the transferee court, concerning whether to grant a § 1407 consolidation
motion. The statute requires that the J.P.M.L. determine whether actions
should be consolidated for pretrial purposes under § 1407. In Pfizer and
Lexecon, the cases had already been consolidated by the J.P.M.L. The
issue was whether the transferee court could rule on a change of venue
motion before remanding the case to the J.P.M.L. It does not follow from
Koratron that the transferee court could rule on a change of venue mo.
tion before remanding the action to the J.P.M.L. as required by the language in the statute.
The courts have also relied on the J.P.M.L. rules to decide this issue.
The J.P.M.L. enacted rules that were contrary to the authority extended
to it under the statute. Rule 14(b) permits the transferee court to hear a
§ 1404(a) change of venue motion. This rule conflicts with the plain
meaning of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute. Since 1971, the federal
courts have relied on Pfizer to allow self-assignment of multidistrict litigation. The legislative purpose and the plain mandate of the statute conflict with the J.P.M.L. rule and the practice of self-assignment.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon, declaring rule 14(b) invalid and clarifying the statute, was long overdue. The Multidistrict Litigation Statute is to be used to increase judicial efficiency only for pretrial
consolidation of complex litigation. Because § 1407 is not limited by the
requirements of the federal venue statutes, the section should not be
used to interfere with the plaintiffs choice of venue. After completion of
discovery, the J.P.M.L. is to return the cases to the transferor court or
courts for further action, including decisions regarding a change of venue.
When a party requests a change of venue for trial, that determination
should be made by the J.P.M.L. if the case had previously been consolidated in another district or by the transferor court, and not by a § 1407
transferee court.
Janice A. Fall

